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THE PUBLIC LAWYER 
Government actors have been clamoring to jump on the 
social media bandwagon 
ever since Barack Obama tapped the 
power of social media in his suc-
cessful bid for the White House.1 At 
least one local government, however, 
recently jumped back off. The city of 
Redondo Beach decided to close its 
Facebook page in light of uncertainty 
over what legal principles cover 
government sponsored social media.2 
Apparently, Redondo Beach officials 
were worried about both public 
records and open meetings laws 
as well as whether defamatory or 
vulgar material would be protected 
by the First Amendment. 
To understand their quandary, at 
least with regard to the First Amend-
ment issue, consider a simple hypo-
thetical. Suppose the city set up its 
Facebook page to allow residents to 
discuss an initiative to reduce energy 
usage. A heated Facebook discussion 
ensues about whether global warm-
ing is a hoax. The mayor then orders 
the removal of posts discussing 
global warming on the grounds that 
they do not relate to city business. 
He also orders the removal of all 
profanity and hate speech directed at 
Muslim Americans. Are the mayor's 
actions constitutional? 
It ought to be easy to answer this 
question, but it isn't. The answer 
requires close examination of public 
forum doctrine, an area of law that 
was "virtually impermeable to com-
mon sense" even before the internet 
came along.3 A few propositions can 
be stated with confidence. A govern-
ment actor who creates a purely 
informational Facebook page, such 
as a "We Love Jonesville" fan page, 
engages in "government speech" 
and therefore retains editorial control 
of the page. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a government actor who 
creates a completely open, interactive 
Facebook page without any explicit 
statement of purpose probably cedes 
all but the most limited forms of 
editorial control over that forum. 
Between the extremes of no inter-
activity and complete interactivity, it 
is difficult to predict whether courts 
will label a government sponsored 
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social media site a public forum or 
not. But it is precisely "in between" 
where government actors are likely 
to wish to engage citizens and where 
citizens are most likely to benefit from 
government social media initiatives. 
The goal of this article, therefore, is to 
provide guidance to lawyers trying 
to navigate the morass that is the 
U.S. Supreme Court's public forum 
jurisprudence in order to advise gov-
ernment actors wishing to establish 
social media forums. 
The Value of Social Media 
First, though, it is worth ask-
ing whether the game is worth the 
candle. Government actors have a 
variety of incentives to use social 
media to reach their constituencies. 
Willie Sutton was reported to have 
said that he robbed banks because 
that's where the money is, and gov-
ernments are turning to social media 
because that's where the citizens are. 
Not only can social media deliver 
large audiences, they can deliver 
demographically desirable ones. 
Social media are also cheap and fast 
tools to reach and mobilize citizens. 
They provide a forum for citizens to 
voice their concerns and to volunteer 
their expertise online using "crowd-
sourcing" or problem solving.4 
Government social media use, 
even when motivated purely by 
self-interest, usually benefits citi-
zens. Citizens benefit from receiving 
government information quickly, 
cheaply and without distortion. 
More significantly, interactive social 
media have the potential to foster 
citizens' First Amendment interests 
in free speech, free association, and 
petitioning government for redress of 
grievances. Interactive social media 
can serve as virtual public squares, 
encouraging interactions among 
citizens who might never meet in a 
real one. Interactive social media also 
encourage the exchange of informa-
tion between governments and the 
governed, providing the "continuous 
process of consultation" that demo-
cratic theory envisions.5 More to the 
point, social media create pressures 
for government officials to respond 
to public demands. 
The current state of the law, how-
ever, may deter realization of social 
media's full potential.6 Public forum 
doctrine, which governs the rights of 
citizens to speak on government prop-
erty, is a "complex maze of categories 
and sub-categories" that determine 
whether government speech restric-
tions are subject to strict or lax con-
stitutional scrutiny. 7 The choice of 
category - whether traditional public 
forum, designated public forum, 
limited public forum, nonpublic 
forum or government speech - often 
determines the outcome of cases, but 
the lines between the categories are so 
blurry that they make it difficult for 
government actors to know how to 
establish social media forums without 
relinquishing all editorial control over 
abusive, indecent or off-topic speech. 
Public Forum Doctrine 
Categories 
The starting point for examining 
modem public forum doctrine is 
Perry Education Association v. Perry 
Local Educators' Association. 8 Perry 
involved a union seeking to com-
municate with teachers via a school 
mail system. The school already had 
granted access to a competing union, 
but the school contended that it 
granted access based on that union's 
status as the exclusive collective bar-
gaining representative of the teachers 
in the district. The Supreme Court 
ultimately determined by a 5-4 vote 
that the school had not designated 
its internal mail system as a public 
forum, and it therefore upheld the 
school's grant of preferential access 
to the incumbent teachers' union as 
"reasonable"9 and viewpoint neu-
tral. Along the way, however, the 
Court used Perry as an opportunity 
to impose order on public forum 
doctrine by delineating three forum 
categories: traditional, designated 
and nonpublic. 
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Traditional Public Forums 
The first category is the tradi-
tional public forum, which includes 
government property such as streets 
or parks that have been devoted 
to public expressive use "by long 
tradition or by government fiat." 10 
In the traditional public forum, the 
state may not impose content-based 
restrictions on speech there unless 
they are "necessary to achieve a com-
pelling state interest and ... narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end."11 Con-
tent-neutral "time, place, and man-
ner" restrictions are permissible, but 
only if they are "narrowly tailored 
to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and leave open ample alter-
native channels of communication."12 
Though one might assume that social 
media could become traditional 
public forums by fiat, the Supreme 
Court has restricted the category 
to property "historically" used for 
public expression, thereby closing it 
to online forums. Thus, a municipal 
park is a traditional public forum 
and so is the public square in front 
of the local courthouse, but a city's 
Facebook page cannot be one. 
Designated Public Forums 
The designated public forum 
"consists of public property which 
the state has opened for use by the 
public as a place for expressive activ-
ity."13 Courts will not find a desig-
nated public forum absent a clear 
indication of government intent to 
open the forum, though such intent 
can be determined in part based on 
"policy and practice" and whether 
the property is of a type compatible 
with expressive activity.14 Examples 
of designated public forums include 
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a university-created "campus free 
speech zone" open to all speakers or 
meeting rooms available for use by 
any member of the public, such as a 
public library. 
In Perry, the designated public 
forum category also included limited 
public forums. The government may 
either open a designated forum to 
the public as a whole, in which case 
it operates no differently than the tra-
ditional public forum and is subject 
to the same constitutional restraints, 
or it may establish a designated but 
"limited" public forum. Although the 
Supreme Court used three categories 
of forums - traditional, designated 
and limited - in its most recent deci-
sion on the issue, 15 it never mentions 
the "non-public forum" discussed 
in prior decisions such as Perry, 16 
making it unclear whether this is a 
separate category or whether it has 
finally collapsed into the limited 
public forum. 
Limited Public Forums 
The harder category, or subcat-
egory, is the limited public forum. 
Doctrinally, this is where things start 
to get messy. Regardless of categori-
zation, the limited public forum is a 
place or space designated for speech 
by "certain groups" or for "discus-
sion of certain subjects."17 For exam-
ple, a university can limit a public 
forum it establishes to use by student 
groups, and a school district can limit 
a public forum to the discussion of 
"school board business."18 However, 
"[i]f the government excludes a 
speaker who falls within the class to 
which a designated public forum 
is made generally available, its 
action is subject to strict scrutiny."19 
In other words, the government's 
establishment and application of con-
tent parameters in the limited public 
forum must be "reasonable in light 
of the purposes served by the forum" 
and viewpoint neutral.20 
One might assume that a con-
stitutional standard that demands 
only reasonableness and viewpoint 
neutrality gives the government 
essentially carte blanche to exclude 
speakers based on subject matter. But 
the Supreme Court has often applied 
reasonableness with "bite" in the 
limited public forum.21 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court decisions in this 
area are almost always decided by 
5-4 votes, making it even harder to 
predict how much leeway govern-
ments have to exert editorial control 
in a limited public forum. 
Nonpublic Forums 
A nonpublic forum is government 
property, such as a military base, that 
"is not by tradition or designation a 
forum for public communication."22 
Within nonpublic forums, govern-
ments may impose time, place and 
manner restrictions and may exclude 
speakers as long as exclusion is 
"reasonable and not an effort to 
suppress expression merely because 
public officials oppose the speaker's 
view."23 In practical effect, a determi-
nation that a forum is nonpublic will 
almost always result in deference 
to the discretion of the government 
actor in deciding who may speak and 
what shall be discussed. 
The line between the designated 
limited public forum and the non-
public forum is maddeningly slip-
pery - and some would even say 
nonexistent, notwithstanding their 
linguistically opposed labels. A 
distinguishing factor between them 
seems to be whether the government 
grants selective access on a case-by-
case basis as opposed to holding the 
property generally open for a limited 
class of speakers. Nonetheless, the 
real differences are slight. In both 
categories, the state must maintain 
viewpoint neutrality, and application 
of state-imposed content parameters 
for the forum will be judged by a 
reasonableness standard for the 
most part. One possible difference 
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is as follows: The Supreme Court 
has said, albeit in dicta, that when 
the state excludes from entrance to a 
limited public forum speakers who 
meet "identity" criteria, strict scru-
tiny should apply. A more relevant 
distinction is that the labels are likely 
to trigger different attitudes of defer-
ence in the judges deciding the cases. 
Arguably, the reasonableness inquiry 
is more likely to be applied with bite 
to a limited public forum than to a 
nonpublic one; but without empirical 
verification, this is pure speculation. 
Reading too much into the labels 
may obfuscate other contextual fac-
tors that shape outcomes in public 
forum cases. 
Government Speech Category 
The final constitutional category 
into which government sponsored 
social media might be slotted is 
government speech, 24 and, indeed, 
this category clearly applies to tweets 
and other noninteractive govern-
ment social media. The heart of 
government speech doctrine is the 
realization that governments must 
speak in order to govern and that 
governments speak through agents 
whom they hire, pay, select, facilitate 
or subsidize.25 Whether online or off, 
the government is permitted to use 
media to communicate its views to 
citizens; and when it does so, it need 
not include opposing viewpoints.26 
Constraints on government speech 
come not from the First Amendment's 
free speech clause but rather from the 
political process, with voters or other 
political actors ostensibly "checking" 
government speech (and government 
actions) with which they disagree.27 
Applying the Categories to 
Interactive, Government 
Sponsored Social Media 
The above categories do not 
track simply and easily with interac-
tive government sponsored social 
media. Under current doctrine, it is 
not immediately clear into which 
of these exclusive categories most 
government social media sites will 
fit; and even where a site is clearly 
a forum of some sort, it is not clear 
how much or how little discretion 
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the government actor will have in 
limiting strong criticism and profane 
or abusive speech. 
As a threshold matter, it's impor-
tant to understand that government 
ownership is not a sine qua non of 
public forum status. A social media 
forum is neither owned nor exclu-
sively controlled by the government 
actor who establishes it.28 If the mayor 
of Jonesville establishes a Facebook 
page, he presumably receives a 
license from Facebook to use its pro-
prietary software. Once the Facebook 
page is established, the mayor does 
not own or control the underlying 
software. Indeed, the mayor does 
not even retain complete editorial 
control of the page because Facebook 
conditions use of its software on a 
user's agreement to certain terms 
and conditions. However, the lack of 
government ownership or exclusive 
control of the social media forum it 
establishes should not preclude a 
finding of public forum status. Just as 
the government can rent a building 
to use as a forum for public debate 
and discussion, so too can it "rent" a 
social media page for the promotion 
of public discussion. 
With this issue settled, it remains 
unclear whether an interactive 
government sponsored social 
media site is a public forum or not. 
A noninteractive Facebook page 
controlled by a government actor is 
undoubtedly government speech, 
meaning that private speakers have 
no First Amendment rights to speak 
in those forums. But more and more 
government actors seem to appre-
ciate the fact that social media's 
primary attraction for citizens is 
interactivity. Consider the White 
House's Facebook page.29 The White 
House clearly identifies the page as 
an official site subject to the Presi-
dential Records Act, and there is no 
mistaking that the White House is 
using it to convey messages and 
videos to citizens. However, the site 
is also set up to allow comments 
from users, although these comments 
can be "flagged" by other users as 
abusive. It is not clear what happens 
to flagged comments. There appears 
to be no official editorial policy 
regarding comments, and there is no 
indication that an administrator from 
the White House ever responds to 
them. 
Is this government speech, a des-
ignated public forum or a nonpublic 
forum? If it is government speech, the 
government need not worry about 
violating the speech rights of those 
who post comments even if the result 
is the creation of an illusion of public 
consensus by selective editing of criti-
cisms of government policy. But if the 
site is deemed a limited public forum 
or nonpublic forum, the government 
has much less control over citizens 
who choose to speak on the site. 
Unfortunately, current First 
Amendment doctrine does not 
contemplate the possibility that the 
page might involve both government 
speech and a public forum.30 Instead, 
it forces a choice between whether 
the page involves government speech 
and whether it involves some form of 
private speech. And yet, the Supreme 
Court has given little guidance 
regarding how to determine whether 
speech is government speech or 
private speech in a case involving an 
interactive social media site, which 
contains elements of both.31 In these 
situations, the government is clearly 
identifiable as a speaker convey-
ing its own message with regard to 
its contributions to the site, but it 
seems just as clear that it is soliciting 
input from citizens speaking from 
a variety of different perspectives.32 
With regard to the comments por-
tion of the site, then, the government 
can also be viewed as creating either 
a designated public forum open to 
commentary from all users on all 
topics or a limited public forum for 
commentary related to the conduct 
of the government actor establishing 
the forum. Given that the interactive 
social media forum is likely to con-
tain elements of government speech 
and a designated public forum, it 
makes it hard to predict what label 
courts will ultimately attach. 
Even so, if a government actor is 
very careful in setting up its social 
media site, it can usually guarantee 
that it is either government speech or 
a nonpublic forum and can therefore 
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retain maximum control over speech 
that occurs there. The Supreme Court 
has made "intent" the key determi-
nant of whether the speech is gov-
ernment speech or whether a forum 
is public or nonpublic. Recall that 
in order for a nontraditional public 
forum to exist, the government must 
designate it as 11 opened for use by 
the public as a place for expressive 
activity."33 Moreover, not only has the 
Court required the decision to open 
a forum to be intentional, that intent 
must also be "demonstrably clear."34 
The practical effect is the creation 
of a presumption against a finding 
of public forum status. Thus, if a 
government actor makes a very clear 
and concrete statement on its social 
media page that it does not intend to 
create a public forum and it reserves 
the right to eliminate comments 
entirely or edit them, it can maximize 
the ability to edit citizen commentary 
on government sponsored social 
media. Nonetheless, there are clearly 
political reasons why government 
actors might not want to take this 
course of action, thus making it more 
likely that courts will be forced to 
discern intent or purpose from the 
nature of the site itself. 
Probable Category: Limited 
Public Forum 
From this perspective, interactive 
government social media sites are 
likely to be categorized as limited 
public forums. In 2010, the Supreme 
Court rearticulated the standards 
governing limited public forums in 
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the 
University of California v. Martinez. 35 
The Court held, by a 5-4 vote, that 
a state law school may condition 
funding of a student organization 
on its willingness "to open eligibility 
for membership and leadership to all 
students."36 The forum in question 
was a student-organization program 
established by Hastings College of 
the Law, which set the parameters 
of the forum to include only student 
organizations that complied with a 
"nondiscrimination policy."37 The 
law school interpreted the policy as 
requiring student organizations to 
accept "all comers." In other words, 
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student organizations had to allow 
any Hastings student to join 11 or 
seek leadership positions in the 
organization, regardless of ... status 
or beliefs."38 The Christian Legal 
Society (CLS) restricted membership 
to students who agreed that they 
believed in Jesus Christ as Savior and 
would eschew homosexual con-
duct. 39 Hastings College of the Law 
therefore denied CLS funding and 
other privileges. CLS sued, claiming 
violation of its rights to freedom of 
association and expression. 
On appeal, the Court majority 
addressed the constitutionality of 
the all-comers policy as a restriction 
on forum parameters,40 stating that 
"[a]ny access barrier must be reason-
able and viewpoint neutral."41 Apply-
ing this standard, the Court deemed 
Hastings College of the Law's various 
justifications for the all-comers 
policy to be reasonable in light of the 
educational purposes of the forum. 
For example, the Court credited 
the law school's assertion that the 
policy ensured that the "leadership, 
educational, and social opportunities 
afforded by" participation in student 
organizations were equally available 
to all students.42 The Court also found 
the all-comers policy to be view-
point neutral because it required 11 all 
student groups to accept all comers."43 
Even if the policy had a greater effect 
on religious student organizations, 
the target of the all-comers policy was 
the discriminatory conduct of reli-
gious organizations rather than their 
religious perspective.44 
Applying Supreme Court juris-
prudence, there is little doubt that 
government sponsored social media 
sites are forums, at least with regard 
to the comments portion of the 
sites. The government designates or 
sets aside this portion of its social 
media site for expressive activity 
by its citizens. Unlike the nonpublic 
forum, which is characterized by 
selective access for chosen speakers, 
the typical government site will be 
open to any social media user who 
seeks it out. But unlike the truly 
open designated public forum, many 
social media sites are likely to place 
constraints on the topics of speech 
simply by their design and name. 
Citizens' comments typically are 
linked to specific "status updates" 
by the government actor. Like a city 
council meeting, the discussion that 
occurs in the social media context is 
designed to be a "bounded conversa-
tion," inherently limited to discus-
sion of the policies and actions of 
the government actor who sponsors 
the site. Even if the status label of 
limited public forum can confidently 
be attached, however, it remains 
unclear how much the government 
may regulate comments to preserve 
relevant and orderly discourse. 
Policing Decency and Decorum 
in Online Public Forums 
Similar uncertainty surrounds 
the question of how much deference 
government actors will receive in 
regulating profane or abusive speech 
in online forums. This question 
is particularly pressing because 
computer-mediated communications 
are more likely than those in the 
"real world" to become profane or 
abusive,45 particularly when speakers 
believe that they are anonymous. The 
government arguably has pressing 
interests in regulating profane and 
abusive speech in online contexts 
simply because the prevalence of 
such speech may hinder the use of 
a social media site as a forum for 
public discourse. To ensure that 
regulation of profanity is not a cloak 
for censorship, the government can 
set up filtering programs that operate 
neutrally and transparently once put 
into place. In fact, some social media 
sites conduct their own monitoring 
and filtering of profane and abusive 
speech, thereby largely eliminating 
the government role in censoring 
such commentary. 
The constitutional limits on the 
government's ability to preserve 
orderly and civil discourse within 
limited public forums are not entirely 
clear. Although the Supreme Court 
announced, in the celebrated case of 
Cohen v. California, that the proper 
remedy for an audience member 
offended by a profane word on a 
jacket is to avert his or her eyes,46 the 
Court has never addressed directly 
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the standard applicable to regulation 
of profanity or abusive speech in a 
limited public forum. The Court did 
address the issue obliquely in South-
eastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, when 
two Tennessee municipal theaters 
refused to allow performances of 
the musical Hair because it involved 
nudity and obscenity.47 However, the 
facts and procedural posture of the 
case are such that its holding provides 
only limited guidance for government 
actors wishing to control profanity in 
online public forums. 
In Conrad, the Court held that the 
municipality's denial of permission 
to use the theaters constituted "a 
prior restraint" issue without "mini-
mal procedural safeguards."48 It is 
unclear whether the municipality 
could have excluded the musical if it 
had jumped through the correct pro-
cedural hoops, though one suspects 
the answer is no because the Court 
emphasized that the case involved 
neither a captive audience nor a 
time, place or manner regulation. 
Still, Conrad gives little indication 
of whether editing profanity after it 
appears in an online public forum 
would be acceptable. Presumably, the 
government's attempts to regulate 
decorum in the limited public forum 
should be evaluated as an attempt to 
preserve the forum for its intended 
purpose and should therefore be 
judged by whether they are reason-
able and viewpoint neutral. Applica-
tion of this test, however, should be 
responsive to the nature or context of 
the forum, and a municipal theater 
dedicated to public performances of 
aesthetic works is hardly analogous 
to a social media forum. 
Lower courts that have addressed 
the issue in the context of city council 
and planning commission meetings 
have struggled to balance the govern-
ment's interest in preserving civility 
in the limited public forum with the 
interests of speakers in addressing 
government actors in the manner 
of their choosing. 49 However, most 
circuit courts that have addressed the 
issue have given great deference to 
government actors attempting to pre-
serve order and decorum. In Stein-
burg v. Chesterfield County Planning 
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Commission, for example, the Fourth 
Circuit upheld a county's "content-
neutral policy against personal 
attacks" against a facial challenge 
because it promoted the "legitimate 
public interest ... of decorum and 
order."50 Steinburg involved a citizen 
who was stopped from speaking 
at a planning commission meeting 
because his remarks were off-topic 
and contained mild personal attacks 
against the commissioners. Because 
the meeting at issue was classified 
as a limited public forum, the Fourth 
Circuit evaluated the county commis-
sion's policy against personal attacks 
only for reasonableness and view-
point neutrality, concluding that the 
commission was "justified in limiting 
its meetings to discussion of speci-
fied agenda items and in imposing 
reasonable restrictions to preserve 
the civility and decorum necessary to 
further the forum's purpose of con-
ducting public business."51 Compare 
of how far governments can go in 
controlling profanity online. The user 
of the online forum ordinarily must 
take some kind of affirmative step to 
seek out comments by fellow users; 
even once a user decides to read the 
comments, she can easily scroll past 
the ones that appear to be offensive. 
In addition, the abusive speaker in 
the online forum poses little danger 
of disrupting a government process 
or impairing its efficiency. Thus, 
there is arguably little justification 
for deferring to government attempts 
to protect the sensibilities of citizens 
who visit its social media site. 
Conclusion 
Regardless of how courts ulti-
mately resolve this issue, one thing 
should be abundantly clear by this 
juncture. Public forum doctrine does 
not foster an optimal level of govern-
ment engagement in social media. 
The lack of clarity in public forum 
Even if the status label of limited 
public forum can confidently 
be attached, it remains unclear 
how much the government may 
regulate comments to preserve 
relevant and orderly discourse. 
the Fourth Circuit's deferential tone 
to that of the Sixth Circuit in Leonard 
v. Robinson, which reversed summary 
judgment in favor of a police officer 
who arrested a citizen "solely for 
uttering 'God damn"' while speaking 
at a township board meeting.52 Citing 
Cohen, the court asserted t 
hat prohibiting the speaker from 
"coupling an expletive to his political 
speech is clearly unconstitutional."52 
The Sixth Circuit, unlike its sister 
circuits, did not find profanity inher-
ently disruptive to the management 
of public business. 
It is not clear whether public dis-
cussion on a social media site is suf-
ficiently similar to public discussion 
in a city council meeting to make the 
Steinburg precedent a good predictor 
doctrine may deter government 
actors from setting up interactive 
forums in the first place lest they 
lose control of their sites to hateful 
and incoherent speakers. However, if 
government actors actually spend the 
time to piece through the minutiae of 
existing public forum doctrine before 
setting up an interactive social media 
site, they may be able to preserve a 
high degree of control over citizens 
whose speech is perceived to jeop-
ardize order, decency and civility. 
Either result, however, is not optimal 
from a First Amendment or public 
policy perspective because a valuable 
tool to facilitate interaction between 
the government and its citizens is 
weakened. • 
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